GMISS 08 Summary Report

Tab 6: Integrating the Commercial Shipping Industry into "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower"

Remarks by

CAPT J. Stephen Maynard, USN,

U.S. Naval War College

09 July 2008

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Delivered at the Marcus-Evans Global Maritime Capabilities Conference

I think we have all come to realize the power of the New Maritime Strategy, formally known as A Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower, which embraces three of the most professional armed forces in today's world. This is a strategy that uses the finest attributes of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard to form an integrated force, capable of synchronizing combat power across a range of military operations-a strategy which also reaches out to international navies to operate in both allied and coalition partnerships against the "tigers" of this world. There is immense value in these concepts whether applied to shaping operations, supporting operations, or decisive operations in both major operations and campaigns. At the U.S. Naval War College, the ability (and even the mindset) to fight as a joint force is at the center of our curriculum. In fact, we define the term joint in its broadest context to include inter-service, interagency, international, intergovernmental, and non-governmental cooperation and integration. We educate our future leaders to value proper planning and execution of joint warfare at the operational and theater-strategic levels, imbuing them with the understanding that tactical prowess does not win wars; but rather, sound, coherent strategies and strong operational leaders decide the outcome.

Certainly, the new maritime strategy provides a sound framework for successfully attaining joint and coalition objectives throughout any maritime theater of operations. Nevertheless, we all recognize it does not guarantee success in today's complex security environment. For without effective operational leadership to bridge the strategic realm to the tactical realm, the overall effort is, at best, terribly wasteful of precious resources or, at worst, a path to defeat. Today's maritime commander cannot afford to think solely of how to conduct power projection with carrier strike groups, or how to hit assigned targets. He must make the transition from the tactical realm with an eye toward the big picture and be able to evaluate both military and non-military aspects of the situation in a theater across a range of military operations. This is the essence of operational thinking and a principle tenet of the operational art. In a world of globalized economies, societies, politics, and information domains, he must especially recognize the distinct limitations of military solutions and constantly evaluate how military actions of the maritime force will affect the other instruments of U.S. power, and influence the conditions that define the national end state. This leads me to an important point, that is, the new maritime strategy implicitly challenges us to exercise operational art-to consider how we can critically analyze sea power in terms of the integration of military and non-military instruments of power toward the attainment of strategic objectives. Yes, we have this superior triumvirate of U.S. sea services, but as the new strategy articulates: "increasingly, governments, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and the private sector will form partnerships of common interest to counter these emerging threats." Even as the strategy was under development, Vice Admiral Morgan and his team at OPNAV acknowledged that a nation's sea power is more than just naval forces operating from the sea. It is also borne of merchant fleets, seagoing commerce, sea ports and associated infrastructure, professional maritime associations, harbor security, even ocean policy and international legal regimes. By nature, then, the enhancement or preservation of sea power involves a wide array of government agencies ranging from Justice, Commerce, Transportation, Interior, and Defense that must remain inextricably engaged with each other. This brings me back to the previous assertion that for the strategy to work, as a practical matter, our military leadership must find the means to creatively integrate the efforts of these agencies at the national, theater strategic and operational levels of command. This confluence of military and non-military capabilities and panoply of interagency interests demands artful leadership and creative campaign design-that is, a vision of the sequence of actions that will lead to the desired strategic objectives. Perhaps not in the sense of a classic campaign, say, as in the Central Pacific in World War II, but more of a steady state, low intensity cooperative interplay of coalition navies, coastal security forces, maritime agencies, commercial industries, and international legal regimes across the globe's maritime theaters that all strive toward a common strategic goal. In this instance, our strategic goal is not the attainment of traditional sea control, as would be the case against belligerent navy conducting open hostilities, but, rather, an acceptable level of enduring theater maritime security amidst a gamut of non-traditional threats often perpetrated by non-state entities. Geoffrey Till nicely summarized these thoughts in Proceedings magazine in 2004, "these diversifying maritime threats...may well require a shift in emphasis from the military to the civil aspects of sea power."

It is to this civil aspect of sea power as embodied in the maritime community that I would like to draw your attention to this afternoon. I intend to advance the discussion of how the U.S. Navy, in conjunction with the U. S. Coast Guard, can sustain a line of operation (or line of action) that integrates private shipping resources into A Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower. I will focus upon how the merchant mariner can enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) through presence, and specifically, to emphasize the unclassified realm of collection and dissemination, often defined as Global Maritime Situational Awareness (GMSA). GMSA, a subset of MDA, is defined as an effort to develop an enhanced capability to identify threats to the maritime domain as early and as distant as possible by integrating data sharing, surveillance, observation, and navigation systems in to a common operating picture, usually in an unclassified environment. Commercial vessels have the distinct capacity to provide a supporting effort, and perhaps serve as the main effort in matters of GMSA. In short, they may act as a critical strength in a campaign that includes maritime security as an operational or theater strategic objective within a maritime theater.

For military people, the marriage of civil and military efforts can be somewhat uncomfortable owing to cultural differences. For the private sector, financial concerns can impede cooperation in what they may view as burdensome or costly requirements. These challenges are not insurmountable. The new maritime strategy focuses upon opportunities as much as threats, and with the greater maritime community, we have a distinct opportunity to strengthen commercial linkages with our traditional seagoing forces, which in the end will magnify the capabilities we are seeking in maritime security. One obvious question facing us is simply why the commercial maritime community would want to concern itself with contributing to the New Maritime Strategy authored and executed by the sea services. Well, just as with coalition or allied operations, private shipping industry shares a common interest with our military (sea) services. The threats we face present clear military and economic perils to homeland security and the free movement of trade, respectively. Hence, we now have a fortuitous opportunity for common action that preserves the safety, security, stability, and economic well-being of the high seas.

The President first codified these mutual objectives in 2005, in the National Strategy for Maritime Security, which established the collaborative potential of civil and military capabilities as a cornerstone tenet. Many successful initiatives have emerged because of this overarching maritime framework, especially in the realm of Maritime Domain Awareness. The U.S. Coast Guard, under the Department of Homeland Security, has assumed the mantra of an "agent of change" in a wide variety of MDA matters that include common operating picture, intelligence fusion and dissemination, port security, staff organization, and communication and database architectures. In 2007, the National Strategy to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, an outgrowth of the NSMS, assigned DHS as the focal point for leveraging commercial assets to correlate position information and to report suspicious vessels. Now, the New Maritime Strategy has a chance to build synergistically upon these existing national strategies by further advancing mutual support between private industry and all of our sea services. As a matter of strategy formulation, maritime professionals recognize that the integration of commercial shipping's capacity is necessary if we are to enhance MDA and thus expect any depth of maritime security; but this is a national (even global) resource that is yet to be fully tapped simply because we are not certain how to practically execute this venture. Commercial shipping across the globe by far and away has the most persistent presence on the high seas. The commercial fleets operate regularly in both the main arteries and backwaters of the world's oceans; as CNA's Bob Work has pointed out, their overwhelming presence easily exceeds the combined warship numbers of all the world's major navies. In addition, a number of privately owned lines in this community, while not in the MDA business, are willing to share information on surface shipping with those who are in the MDA business, because they recognize it is in their long-term interest to contribute to a safe and stable transportation environment. This perspective first came to my attention in discussions with our maritime strategy analytical team at the Naval War College. While conducting a number of workshops to explore possible strategy options, the team received some particularly salient input from Mr. Steve Carmel, the vice president of Maersk Line, Limited based out of Norfolk, Virginia. Steve's observations focused on the potential role of the commercial shipping industry in the New Maritime Strategy. In short, Steve's argument (as outlined in the Naval War College Review) is simple: Maersk and other similar commercial lines possess a preponderance of presence on the global commons. They do not want to be simply a passive object of the new maritime strategy but an active partner in implementing a strategy that advances the collective security goals of all states.

This is a perspective that we cannot deny. Maersk operates more ocean-going ships than all of the world's major navies combined. Anyone who has experienced the expanse of the world's oceans and the attendant difficulty of establishing a coherent tactical picture in just a small portion of water space realizes that numbers count when it comes to intelligence collection, persistent surveillance, and on-demand reconnaissance capability. If you don't have the numbers (in other words--the force), you either need more time or a smaller area to achieve an acceptable degree of situational awareness. The latter two factors are not going to change, hence, as the new strategy advises, the sea services or even all the world navies, cannot accomplish an acceptable level of maritime domain awareness unilaterally. To offset the risk incurred by a lack of naval forces, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard would seem, then, to be compelled to pursue a course of action for maritime security that lashes the commercial sector with the military instrument of power.

The commercial shipping industry has remarkably consistent and widespread global presence. Maersk, for example, operates over 1000 ocean-going vessels that call on over 300 ports around the world. As Mr. Carmel outlines in his work, the shipping density reports provided under the AMVER website provide a solid illustration of the power of private sector presence. [NOTE: AMVER is a voluntary partnership of maritime entities to save lives at sea, which the U.S. Coast Guard administers]. This site depicts daily voyage counts that average more than 3,000 including many in rather remote areas that are not frequented by the world's navies. That is good news; but better is the fact that these vessels are not merely detection platforms, but are endowed with experienced mariners who are quite capable of recognizing anomalous operating patterns or behaviors with respect to surface ship operations. Drawing from their rich experience and knowledge of vessel traffic patterns and transit routines, they possess a day-to-day awareness of exactly what constitutes normal activities and behaviors on the high seas as well as in seaports and offshore facilities. Moreover, these vessels frequently travel along extended open-ocean routes, where significant collection (or sensor) gaps presently exist due to the lack of long range automated ship reporting. In essence, private shipping may be likened to the maritime equivalent of human intelligence, with seasoned mariners at once collecting, reporting, and conducting initial analysis through pattern recognition.

Because traffic on the oceans' surface is not under positive control like that in the air, the man in the decision loop cannot be overestimated; the experienced mariner is able to add context to the data at hand-and there is a lot of data available. In particular, the Automated Information System (AIS) developed under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), has blossomed into the international reporting standard for surface vessels over 300 tons. It is a reliable capability for cooperative vessels but is limited to coastal reporting, owing to its reliance upon VHF or a line-of sight communication medium. The next-generation IMO reporting system, known as the Long Range Information and Tracking (LRIT) system, will soon expand vessel reporting and tracking to open ocean areas using satellite technology. Both AIS and LRIT will nicely contribute to the collective efforts to improve data collection, but they are not the silver bullet of MDA because they are not immune to the duplicity of uncooperative or hostile vessels. These systems are subject to spoofing and only report what and when they are told to report. This is where the value of the on-scene mariner can make a difference; he may well be able to validate AIS/LRIT data against vessel profiles and radar data, or be able to detect those vessels that are not broadcasting in accordance with international protocols. I would liken the use of the commercial shipping industry to enhance maritime security on the high seas to the U.S. Coast Guard's waterway watch program known as Prevention through People. This initiative has called upon those involved in the maritime industry, and especially the public, to work together to prevent incidents, which threaten U.S., waters by reporting suspicious activities. While this comparison may be simplistic, it emphasizes the advantages of large numbers of experienced seafarers who have everyday knowledge of the waters they operate upon when it comes to protecting maritime interests. The same can be said of the commercial mariner on the high seas-he brings the human element to bear in a similar role except on a global scale.

This is not to say that the injection of technology to leverage the persistent presence of commercial shipping is without merit. On the contrary, there are some promising developments in experimentation with automated data collection systems embedded on commercial shipping. We are fortunate that one of the shipping industry's leaders, Maersk Lines, Limited has assumed such a progressive role in achieving better security for the common good. Maersk has teamed with Lockheed-Martin (with supplemental funding from the Department of Transportation) to create a proprietary data collection and fusion system for experimental use on their vessels. Known as Neptune, this system integrates organic AIS and radar along with an INMARSAT interface to automatically record and transmit vessel traffic data. It is relatively low cost, unobtrusive, and near real time. The raw data derived from shipboard sensors is fused at a centralized service center ashore. There, track history, analysis, anomalous tracks, or alerts for potential vessels of interest are generated and made available through various on-demand user products. Further, it has potential to be correlated with other commercial data such as those maintained by major insurance companies ( e.g. Lloyd's Fairplay. A system such as this, proliferated on a global scale, could provide an exponential increase in open ocean data collection, storage, and sharing. Coupled with the cognitive validation of the experienced mariner, the commercial shipping industry could provide a significant supporting effort to our family of strategic MDA plans and the New Maritime Strategy. This is perhaps the most promising means of overcoming the lack of high-density naval presence on the high seas without creating unreasonable demands upon government resources.

These technological developments hold promise but are of marginal value if applied in a proprietary manner. The Navy's recently promulgated Global Maritime Partnership Concept, much like A Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower, champions the collective capabilities of private and public players, with both entities contributing to a transparent environment where ill-willed actors are not able to hide. As previously mentioned, this construct cannot occur without interagency cooperation, which must be the order of the day. The Navy and Coast Guard have made modest strides in reaching out to civil maritime associations to build MDA capacity but these efforts need to mature. The Maritime Administration (MARAD), under the Department of Transportation, is nicely positioned to serve as an intermediary with private American shipping industries and as a government leader in networking the ways and means of collecting surface vessel information across the globe. In their Vision statement for the 21^st Century, MARAD affirms the role of the maritime industry as a first line of defense against illicit maritime activity, or the "eyes and ears" of Global Maritime Situational Awareness, by reporting suspicious acts observed around the world during the course of normal commercial, maritime operations. MARAD is a relatively small USG organization, but they are leaning forward in this concept. In fact, MARAD will assumed the role of program manager for the Volpe National Transportation System Center database that European Command has adopted, known as the Maritime Safety & Security Information System (MSSIS). MSSIS serves as a successful model of an unclassified network that is able to collect and openly share AIS data derived from both naval and commercial sources in chokepoint waterways across the globe. It is a real-time system that uses a web-based, password-protected interface. MSSIS is just one example of a system that demonstrates the power of international cooperation and centralized data basing of both naval and commercial inputs. However, it is limited to coastal approaches dictated by the range limitations of AIS. But imagine if merchant vessels could generate swaths or corridors of information that extended across the open oceans using systems similar to the ones under experimentation with Maersk--a system that not only reported own vessel via AIS or LRIT, but also radar data and visual observations, and then automatically fed this input into a common database such as MSSIS. The 2000 mile monitoring zone desired by the U.S. Coast Guard might just become a reality. Although MSSIS represents just one possible solution, perhaps this initiative is a harbinger of good things to come in terms of creating a cooperatively shared information network across each maritime theater, in the littorals and the open ocean-one which values both military and non-military source data-one which share with allies, agencies, and the private sector. Regardless of where the data entry point occurs (and there are several apparent options), it will be particularly important to be judicious in how the data derived from private industry is handled. This information is regarded to varying degrees as business sensitive, and it must be treated as such if we are to overcome the natural wariness of the private sector in making all data completely transparent. For data interfaces with the U.S. side, these matters may fall under the aegis of DISA and incorporated within the Navy's FORCENET concepts. However, the emphasis of this address is not just about how to design an interoperable architecture because by many indications it seems to be technically feasible to interlock these disparate databases (and plenty of other brilliant people are working that problem) but, rather, to emphasize that the sea services must not underestimate the value of presence with respect to detection and reporting. Without the degree of presence in both coastal and open ocean expanses that only the commercial sector, the merchant marine, the maritime private industry can deliver, it will not be possible to attain an acceptable degree of risk in pursuit of our maritime security objectives. We must plan dual-path initiatives, those that affect parallel efforts to overcome financial and cultural hindrances as well as technical challenges.

As Martin Murphy from the Jebson Counter Terrorism Center at Tufts has remarked, since WWII the link between naval power and maritime power has become attenuated. Decades of relative security on the high seas have naturally widened this gap, and the migration of registration and ownership to offshore entities due to regulation has eroded this relationship. However, civil and military interests on the high seas tend to come closer when mutually threatened in conflict; the events of this millennium have awakened the maritime community to realize that security of the seas is no longer a presumed strategic condition. This new security environment has provided renewed impetus to unite military and non-military instruments in achieving the national strategic objective of maritime security.

As we proceed along what some call a global campaign, the Navy must grow to value and respect what the private maritime industry is able to contribute. For in the same manner that mutual trust and confidence must be won with international partners in coalition warfare, so it must be with private industry partners across the maritime community. This is a vital aspect of effective operational leadership. Our nation's sea service commanders (as with all operational commanders) must be able to practically inject the capacities of the civil sector into the campaign designs of each geographic area of responsibility. At the Naval War College, we have challenged our military's future leaders to creatively integrate all instruments of power into operational design. We educate them to boldly and innovatively translate strategic guidance into achievable military objectives, and then to exercise vision to conceive a sound operational idea, one that is difficult for the enemy to counter, and to pursue indirect methods of attacking his weaknesses. I suggest that civil-military relationships are a pivotal part of the operational idea for maritime security.

Although MARAD is only a bit piece in the global scheme of things, they are globally recognized and more than able to serve as a leader in development of recommendations to implement the tenets of the New Maritime strategy. Starting with the U.S.-flagged fleet, they have the potential to ensure that the flow of commerce is balanced against security demands in U.S. waters. In this regard, they can serve as a wonderful bridge between the sea services and our professional civilian seafarers; moreover, they play a higher, interagency role in coordinating with the greater DOD and DHS realms. Rear Admiral Metcalf, USN, in his position as Director of the National Office, Global Maritime Situational Awareness Center, serves as a natural conduit to exchange ideas between the military instruments of power and with MARAD and the private sector. While MARAD is focused solely on U.S.-flagged shipping policies, its much stronger international counterpart under the United Nations, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), could parallel MARAD efforts to influence the international maritime community to unify civil-military efforts, especially to establish standards of collection and reporting of maritime vessel traffic on a global scale. For, in the end, for the commercial shipping system to have true value it must be an international effort coordinated by flag state authorities around the world. Other nations cannot perceive this as a U.S.-led intelligence initiative, but a truly international initiative for the benefit of all. Because of this consideration, we must acknowledge that internationally-generated data probably should not be stored in the U.S., but under the management of some international authority, with the U.S. Navy, for instance, being one customer along with other navies and flag state authorities. This will require a substantial shift in the traditional American tendency to hold information close. We do not tend to share well, which we will have to overcome. In addition, the participation of other flag state authorities will do away with a real concern that non-participating countries could retaliate against participating vessels. For example, if China decides not to participate, but also blocks ships from companies that do participate from entering Chinese ports, that is a real problem. For this concept to be truly effective it must be an international and transparent effort, something else MARAD could take the lead in facilitating.

This concept I have set before you today is surely not a profound or complex revelation. However, it is a powerful one that will yield operational value beyond the military resources apportioned against it. Speaking as a "black shoe," I know the information derived from a common system suggested here would have tremendous value in terms of operational intelligence and operational protection-two function necessary for efficient mission execution.

I am encouraged that our new maritime strategy has the concept right-that is, the integration of civil (non-military) and government (military) capabilities into a campaign. Campaigns are inherently joint, and the new strategy embraces " joint-ness " in the fullest sense by ascribing to cooperative efforts not only by inter-service means, but also by interagency, international, inter-governmental, non-governmental, and private venture organizations to accomplish strategic objectives. This is refreshingly progressive thinking; yet, if the civil-military construct is to have operational value, the Navy in particular must dedicate adequate resources against it and define its overall priority, taking into account its benefits toward achieving the desired end state and the commensurate strategic risk should it be under-resourced. We must embark upon this endeavor while those progressive thinkers in the industry, like Steve Carmen from Maersk, have the will to contribute to the greater good of all mariners, American commerce, and the American shipping industry. They want to help but cannot do so without a return commitment. However, we must be realistic; dedicating high priority resources against this concept is a tall order given it is not linked directly to force structure arguments. Thus, the path to maritime civil-military integration will be a deliberate one--it will take the same degree of patience as with any coalition operation. A case in point is JIATF South's effort in the counter-narcotic fight, which took 10 years to integrate USG Agencies to achieve optimal surface vessel MDA. Perhaps we could start modestly, by establishing something as simple as worldwide 24 x 7 telephonic means to report potential high interest vessels from sea, or adopt a universally accepted SITREP template for voluntary line item reporting to a regional operations center.

In conclusion, given what is at stake, that is, the vitality of our maritime commerce and the security of our homeland, surely both sectors will find it possible to establish mutual interests that will meld their capacities. Let us improve dialogue, value each other's strengths, and respectfully acknowledge each other's limitations. Of course, we must migrate beyond elementary measures and begin to work earnestly together to develop a Concept of Operations (or an operational idea) under the umbrella of our national and maritime strategic guidance. If a common interest, such as life saving, can provide incentive for universally accepted systems such as the Coast Guard-administered AMVER program, then it should be feasible to establish a common network that supports the integration of private shipping capacities into our GMSA constructs. In the ongoing OEF and OIF campaigns, particularly on the ground, we are witnessing the forging of new civil-military bonds, spurred by the demands of irregular warfare. Why should these same civil military bonds not come to full maturity within the maritime domain against similar irregular or non-traditional threats? Along this thought, I will close with a similar conclusion set forth in A Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower: The Sea Services cannot do this alone. The diverse elements of the greater maritime community must be inspired and supported as they invest to secure peace and prosperity across the maritime domain. That, ladies and gentlemen, says it all.

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-- ChadHolmes - 26 Jan 2009